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INTRODUCTION
The idea that an employer may be liable for simply hiring or
retaining an employee who later causes an injury may seem like a
nightmare for employers. The threat of potential punitive damages 1 for
an employee’s intentional acts outside the scope of employment may
cause employers further grief. But this is exactly the kind of liability
that negligent hiring and negligent retention claims create. While some
employers may scoff at what may seem like yet another liability,
various limiting principles help ensure that these torts do not have a
wide scope. Employers, therefore, do not need to worry that they may
become “an insurer of the safety of every person who happens to come
into contact with [an] employee.” 2

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; M.P.A., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2009; B.A., University of
Rhode Island, 2005.
1
See, e.g., Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, Inc., 387 N.E.2d 1241 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979).
2
Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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Yet, despite these limiting principles, courts may be tempted to
expand the scope of negligent hiring and retention when faced with
sympathetic plaintiffs. Negligent hiring and negligent retention claims
often involve plaintiffs who have been the victims of atrocious crimes
at the hands of a defendant’s employee. The injuries occur under
circumstances where ordinary theories of employer liability, such as
respondeat superior or liability under civil rights statutes, do not
apply. In such situations, a court may feel justified in pushing the
boundaries of negligent hiring and retention claims so that the injured
party can receive some remedy. This tendency, however, may create
employer liability where traditionally there has been none.
As such, it is important for negligent hiring and retention
claims to have some clear limitations. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts sets out a bright line rule, limiting these claims to intentional
acts that occur on an employer’s premises or using an employer’s
chattels. 3 This premises/chattel standard has the advantage of creating
easily defined, clearly recognizable limits on employer liability for
negligent hiring and retention. However, in practice, mechanical
application of this standard can lead to seemingly unjust results.
The court in Anicich v. Home Depot was faced with one such
situation. In Anicich, the plaintiff’s daughter was the victim of a brutal
murder at the hands of a Home Depot employee who was the
daughter’s supervisor. The murder occurred hundreds of miles from
where they worked and did not involve any of Home Depot’s
chattels. 4 Yet, the crime seemed inextricably linked to the supervisor’s
employment. In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint, the Seventh Circuit declined to apply a
“formalistic adherence” to the Restatement’s premises/chattel
standard. 5 The court instead chose to modify the standard and
determined that supervisory authority fell within the meaning of
3

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2017);
Michael Tarm, Court restores Plainfield woman's suit accusing Home Depot of
negligence in daughter's slaying, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 28, 2017).
5
Id. at 651.
4
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chattel. 6 In doing so, the court may have avoided an “odd, even
arbitrary result,” 7 but it also may have inadvertently expanded
negligent hiring and retention beyond traditionally accepted limits.
What the court characterized as an “incremental shift,” 8 may actually
be an amorphous and wide-reaching standard if fully embraced by
Illinois courts.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit may have created this
standard unnecessarily. Illinois courts have never strictly adhered to
the Restatement’s premises/chattel standard. Instead, they have used it
as a guidepost along with other tort theories of foreseeability and
proximate cause. If the Anicich court had simply applied a broad
interpretation of foreseeability to the case, it could have reached the
same result without modifying the Restatement’s standard. Thus, the
court could have made a true “incremental shift” instead of creating a
new, amorphous standard.
To put the Anicich court’s decision in context, Part I of this
article discusses the elements of negligent hiring and negligent
retention claims as well as the scope of employer liability under these
torts. In Part II, the article then exams how the Seventh Circuit applied
Illinois case law in Anicich v. Home Depot. That Part also discusses
how the court formulated a novel interpretation of the Restatement’s
premises/chattel standard. In Part III, this article examines how Illinois
courts have traditionally applied negligent hiring standards and how
the Anicich court’s approach differed from those standards. Finally, in
Part IV, the article examines the broad purpose of negligent hiring and
retention claims and comments on how the Anicich court may have
extended their scope. That Part also examines alternative approaches
the Anicich court could have taken to reach the same result without
significantly expanding traditional negligent hiring and retention
claims.

6

Id.
Id.
8
Id. at 654.
7
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I. WHAT ARE NEGLIGENT HIRING AND NEGLIGENT RETENTION
CLAIMS?
The torts of negligent hiring and negligent retention hold
employers liable for the intentional actions of their employees which
occur outside the scope of employment and which have some
connection to the employment relationship. Under negligent hiring and
retention, the employer is directly liable for negligence because the
employer should have known that its employee was a danger to
others. 9 These claims are distinct from respondeat superior claims,
which focus on the tortious acts of the employee acting within the
scope of employment.
Under the familiar doctrine of respondeat superior, an
employer is “subject to the liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment.” 10 Tortious
acts of employees are effectively imputed to the employer so long as
the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. 11 While
there is no precise definition for “scope of employment,” the definition
broadly includes conduct by the employee if: “(a) it is of the kind he is
employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized
time and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the master.” 12 For liability to attach to the employer,
the burden is on the plaintiff to show a “contemporaneous relationship
between the tortious act and scope of employment.” 13
While respondeat superior focuses on the tortious conduct of
the employee, negligent hiring and negligent retention are grounded in
the idea that the employer itself is negligent. Unlike respondeat
superior, it is the employer’s own negligence that is the proximate
9

Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 905 (Ill. 1999).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958); see, e.g., Pyne v.
Witmer, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (Ill. 1989).
11
See Tatham v. Wabash R. Co., 107 N.E.2d 735, 735-36 (Ill. 1952); Pyne,
543 N.E.2d at 1308.
12
Pyne, 543. N.E.2d at 1308 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
228 (1958)).
13
Id. at 1309.
10
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cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 14 Also unlike respondeat superior,
liability extends to employee actions that occur outside the scope of
employment. 15
A. Elements of Negligent Hiring and Negligent Retention
Illinois recognizes a duty for employers to act reasonably in
hiring, supervising, and retaining their employees. 16 This duty holds
an employer liable when it knew, or should have known, that an
employee was “unfit for the job so as to create a danger of harm to
third persons.” 17 In Illinois, the elements of negligent hiring and
negligent retention are:
(1) that the employer knew or should have known that the
employee had a particular unfitness for the position so as to
create a danger of harm to third persons; (2) that such
particular unfitness was known or should have been known at
the time of the employee's hiring or retention; and (3) that
this particular unfitness proximately caused the plaintiff's
injury. 18
While use of the terms negligent hiring, negligent retention, and
negligent supervision suggest three separate torts, Illinois courts do not
make significant distinctions between the three, and all three generally
follow this same analysis. 19

14

Van Horne, 705 N.E.2d at 905.
Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993).
16
Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. 852 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2017); Van
Horne, 705 N.E.2d at 904.
17
Van Horne, 705 N.E.2d at 904.
18
Id.
19
Zahl v. Krupa, 927 N.E.2d 262, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (citing Van Horne,
705 N.E.2d at 904).
15
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Under the first element, the employee must have a “particular
unfitness” that gives rise to a danger of harm to third parties. 20 While
this is a seemingly broad standard, particular unfitness typically only
encompasses behaviors that exhibit violent or criminal tendencies.
Illinois courts have not found non-threatening qualities, such as a
physical impairment or learning defect, as forms of a particular
unfitness for purposes of negligent hiring or retention. Some examples
of a particular unfitness include a reputation or propensity for
violence, 21 moral turpitude that poses a danger to minors, 22 and
harassing behavior towards subordinates. 23
It is not enough for the employee to simply have a particular
unfitness. The employer must know or should know of the employee’s
particular unfitness. 24 Often, courts will look to see if an employer
should have conducted a background check and whether that
background check would have discovered an employee’s particular
unfitness. 25 However, having actual notice of the particular unfitness
will satisfy this element. 26
Finally, plaintiffs must show that there is a causal connection
between the plaintiff’s injuries and the fact of employment. 27 This
proximate cause element limits employer liability only to situations
20

Van Horne, 705 N.E.2d at 905.
Gregor by Gregor v. Kleiser 443 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
22
Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997).
23
Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2017).
24
Van Horne, 702 N.E.2d at 905.
25
See, e.g,, Mueller 678 N.E.2d at 664 (criminal background check would have
revealed danger to children); Strickland v. Communications and Cable of Chicago,
Inc., 710 N.E.2d 55, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (even if company had performed a
background check, it would not uncovered a negative employment history or
significant criminal record).
26
See, e.g., Tatham v. Wabash R. Co., 107 N.E.2d 735, 735 (Ill. 1952)
(employers knew an employee was a “vicious, contentious, pugnacious and illtempered person” at time of hiring); Gregor, 443 N.E.2d at 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(defendants knew the man they hired as a bouncer had extraordinary physical
strength and “vicious propensities for violence”).
27
Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
21
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where the plaintiff’s injuries are “brought by reason of employment of
the unfit employee.” 28 To determine proximate cause, “it is necessary
to inquire whether the injury occurred by virtue of the servant’s
employment.” 29 The proximate cause requirement protects employers
from becoming “an insurer of the safety of every person who happens
to come into contact with his employee simply because of his status as
an employee.” 30
Many (if not most) negligent hiring and retention claims fail at
the proximate cause element. 31 Illinois courts have applied a “rigorous
standard” for the proximate cause requirement. 32 Courts require that
the “employment itself must create the situation where the employee’s
violent propensities harm the third person.” 33 While the existence of
proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury, a
defendant may be entitled to summary judgment if the evidence is
insufficient to establish an employer’s negligence as the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. 34
The proximate cause element requires some foreseeability to
the employer. It is satisfied when “the employee's particular unfitness
‘rendered the plaintiff's injury foreseeable to a person of ordinary
prudence in the employer's position.’” 35 The foreseeability standard in

28

Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993).
29
Bates, 502 N.E.2d at 459.
30
Id.
31
See, e.g., Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898 (Ill. 1999); Doe v. Boy
Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch.
Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Carter, 628 N.E.2d 602; and
Bates, 502 N.E.2d 453.
32
Doe v. Boy Scouts, 4 N.E.3d at 561.
33
Carter 628 N.E.2d at 604.
34
Id.
35
Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Platson v. NSM, America, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 1278, 1284 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001)).

323

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13, Issue 1

Fall 2017

negligent hiring and retention is similar to the standard in other torts. 36
Defendants do not need to foresee the exact harm or injury, but rather
reasonably foresee that some harm could occur. 37
B. Limiting Principles
One could imagine that extending employer liability to
employee actions outside the scope of employment could expose
employers to a wide range of claims. However, Illinois courts have
imposed a number of limiting principles on negligent hiring and
retention claims to prevent this. First, courts have generally limited
these claims to cases where the employee is on the employer's
premises or using an employer chattel at the time of injury. 38 This
follows the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 317. 39 This rule helps to limit the employer’s liability to cases
where the injury happened “by virtue of the [tortfeasor’s]
employment,” rather than simply where “the tortfeasor and the victim
knew each other through work.” 40In addition, while perhaps not
required, negligent hiring and retention claims typically involve some
form of physical injury to the plaintiff’s person or property. 41
Another limit is that certain causes of action foreclose claims
of employer negligence. For example, employers who are found to
have respondeat superior liability cannot also be sued under negligent
hiring. 42 Thus, injuries that arise from an employee acting within the
36

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (1965) (“If the actor's conduct is
a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it
occurred does not prevent him from being liable.”).
37
Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., 15 N.E.3d 545, 552 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2014).
38
See Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 561 (Ill. App. Ct.
2014);Escobar v. Madsen Const. Co., 589 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
39
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
40
Anicich, 852 F.3d at 650.
41
Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 905 (Ill. 1999).
42
Gant v. L.U. Transport Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
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scope of his duties will typically fall under respondeat superior rather
than negligent hiring or retention.
In addition, negligent hiring and retention claims may be
preempted by state statutes governing civil rights violations. 43 The
Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA) prohibits employment
discrimination based on sex, age, race, color, religion, arrest record,
marital status, sexual orientation, physical and mental disability,
citizenship status, national origin, ancestry, unfavorable military
discharge, military status, sexual harassment, and orders of
protection. 44 Illinois courts have found that tort claims are preempted
by the IHRA when the underlying tort is “inextricably linked to a civil
rights violation such that there is no independent basis for the action
apart from the Human Rights Act itself.” 45 Thus, an injury that results
from discrimination against a protected category would be preempted
by the IHRA.
Finally, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act’s (IWCA)
exclusivity provision bars common law claims for accidental injuries
that occur during the course of employment. 46 The Act provides
exceptions to this provision if “(1) the injury was not accidental; (2)
the injury did not arise from [the employee’s] employment; (3) the
injury was not received during the course of [the employee’s]
employment; or (4) the injury was not compensable under the Act.” 47
Even with these exceptions, many potential negligent hiring and

43

See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1997).

44

775 ILCS 5/2-102; 775 ILCS 5/2-103.
Welch v. Illinois Supreme Court, 751 N.E.2d 1187, 1196 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001); see also Gaughan v. Crawford, 2009 WL 631983 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (dismissing
a negligent hiring and retention claim because it was so inextricably linked to an
underlying sexual harassment claim and thus barred by the Illinois Human Rights
Act).
46
820 ILCS 305/5(a).
47
Meerbrey v. Marshall Field and Co., Inc., 564 N.E.2d 1222, 1226 (Ill. 1990).
45
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retention claims are likely to be preempted by the IWCA’s exclusivity
provisions. 48
Thus, negligent hiring and retention claims only apply in a
relatively narrow set of circumstances where the employee is acting
outside the scope of his employment, there is some connection to the
employment relationship, and civil rights or workers’ compensation
statutes do not otherwise preempt the claims.
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF NEGLIGENT HIRING AND
RETENTION STANDARDS
In a factually gruesome case, the Seventh Circuit stretched
Illinois’s negligent hiring and retention standards beyond their usual
limits. Though the court labeled the plaintiff’s story “all too
familiar,” 49 the horrific nature of events that transpired perhaps led the
court to allow a negligence claim where others may have failed.
A. Factual Background
The facts of Anicich are ghastly. Brian Cooper was the regional
manager for the defendant-employers, Home Depot U.SA., Inc., Grand
Service, LLC, and Grand Flower Growers, Inc. 50 Cooper had a history
of sexually harassing his female subordinates. 51 A prior female
employee had complained of Cooper making comments about his
genitals to her and of Cooper rubbing himself against her. 52 Cooper
became increasingly loud and abusive with her, ultimately leading her
to quit. 53
48

See, e.g., Walker v. Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park, 110 F.Supp.2d 704
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (barring a negligent retention claim when the plaintiff’s injury arose
from a co-worker’s assault).
49
Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2017).
50
Id. at 647.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
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Sometime after this, Alisha Bromfield began working at one of
the Home Depots that Cooper managed. 54 She was only a teenager
when she began working at the store in 2006. 55 Shortly after she
started, Cooper exhibited similar behaviors towards Bromfield as he
had with the prior female employee. 56 He called Bromfield his
girlfriend, swore and yelled at her, called her names like “bitch,”
“slut,” and “whore” in front customers, and slammed things around
her. 57 As time went on, Cooper became increasingly controlling,
monitoring Bromfield’s lunches, texting her outside of work, and
pressuring her to spend time alone with him. 58 He even required that
she accompany him on business trips, one time insisting that they
share a hotel room. 59
This pattern of abuse culminated when Cooper pressured
Bromfield to accompany him to his sister’s wedding in Wisconsin. 60
After Bromfield initially refused, Cooper compelled her to go by
threatening to either fire her or reduce her hours. 61 At their hotel room
after the wedding, Cooper demanded that Bromfield enter into a
relationship with him. 62 When Bromfield refused, Cooper strangled
Broomfield, killing her and her seven-month old fetus. 63 He then
proceeded to rape her corpse. 64
Prior to this crime, multiple senior managers at Home Depot
were aware of Cooper’s behavior towards Bromfield and other female
employees. 65 Bromfield had complained repeatedly about Cooper to
54

Id.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 648.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 647.
55
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other supervisors and managers, and told her group leader that she did
not want to be left alone with him. 66 One time, Cooper was sent home
after he called Bromfield a “slut” and “whore” in front of customers. 67
Cooper was subsequently ordered to take anger management classes,
though the defendant-employer never followed up to see that he did
so. 68 Despite the fact that senior management was aware of Cooper’s
behavior, Cooper remained Bromfield’s supervisor until her death. 69
B. How the Seventh Circuit Applied Illinois Negligent Hiring and
Retention Standards
Perhaps tacitly acknowledging that they were aware of
Cooper’s particular unfitness, the defendants focused their defense on
duty and proximate causation. The defendants argued that they should
not be liable under negligent hiring and retention theories because: (1)
allowing the case to go forward would create “new and unjustifiable
burdens for employers”; (2) these claims only apply “when the
employee is on the employer’s premises or using the employer’s
chattel”; and (3) Bromfield’s injury “was not foreseeable to a person
of ordinary prudence in the employer’s position.” 70
The court first turned its attention to whether the defendants
had a duty to fire or demote employees because of their “usage of
inappropriate language, or sexual misconduct.” 71 The defendants
claimed that such an obligation, and the resulting burdens, would be
intolerable. 72 However, the court noted that defendants already had
these obligations under existing sexual harassment and sexual
discrimination law. 73 Citing a string of sexual harassment cases
66

Id.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 647-48.
70
Id .at 649.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 649-50.
73
Id. at 650.
67

328

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/11

12

: Your Supervisor As Your Chattel: Broadening the Scope of Negligen

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13, Issue 1

Fall 2017

where employers were vicariously liable for failing to prevent and
correct sexual harassment, the court reasoned that applying these
principles to tort law would not impose any new obligations on
employers. 74
The court next turned to the thorny issue of whether liability
would extend to Cooper’s actions which occurred off the employer’s
premises and which did not involve the employer’s chattels. The rule
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Illinois Supreme
Court has cited in negligence claims, 75 states that a master may be
liable for the tortious conduct of its servants while acting outside the
scope of his employment if:
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or
upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his
servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to
control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control. 76
In this case, Cooper murdered Bromfield while off duty, in a
different state, after attending his sister’s wedding. 77 Could the
Restatement’s rule be extended to such actions?
The court first noted that the purpose of the rule was to limit
the employer’s liability to injuries that “occurred by virtue of the

74
75

Id.
See Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1178-79 (Ill.

2001).
76
77

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
Anicich, 852 F.3d at 649.
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servant’s employment.” 78 In particular, the rule seeks to “avoid
holding an employer liable simply because the tortfeasor and the
victim knew each other through work.” 79 Here, the court reasoned,
Cooper did use something given to him by virtue of his employment:
his supervisory authority over Bromfield. 80
While not a chattel in the traditional sense, Cooper’s
supervisory authority is analogous. 81 Refusing to apply “[f]ormalistic
adherence to the literal terms of § 317(a) [of the Restatement of
Torts],” 82 the court found “no principled reason to hold employers
liable for the tortious abuse of their chattels but not for the tortious
abuse of supervisory authority.” 83 In effect, chattels and supervisory
authority are both tools which the employer entrusts to the employee,
both of which can enable tortious conduct, and both of which require
monitoring by the employer. 84 Injuries resulting from an abuse of
supervisory authority do indeed occur “by virtue of the [tortfeasor’s]
employment, and not because the tortfeasor and victim merely know
each other through their work.” 85
The court did not characterize this analogy between chattels
and supervisory authority as a significant extension of tort liability.
Rather, it relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency to show that
employer liability for an employee’s misuse of authority is, in fact, an
established principle in law. 86 Acknowledging that the Restatement
(Second) of Agency generally limits liability only to when the servant
is acting within the scope of employment or purporting to act on the
78

Id. 650 (quoting Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 561 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2014)).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 651.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 652.
85
Id. (quoting Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550 (Ill. App. Ct.
2014)).
86
Id.
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principal’s behalf, 87 the court nonetheless found that employer liability
can extend to intentional torts committed outside the scope of
employment when a supervisory employee is abusing his authority. 88
In drawing this conclusion, the court relied on the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth which extended an employer’s vicarious liability under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One of the issues in Ellerth was
“whether an employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor…
mak[es] explicit threats to alter a subordinate's terms or conditions of
employment… but does not fulfill the threat.” 89 Relying, in part, on
Section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 90 the
Supreme Court held that an employer could indeed be vicariously
liable for harm caused by the misuse of supervisory authority even
when no tangible employment action is taken, subject to an affirmative
defense. 91
The Restatement of Employment Law adopted this same
position for causes of action beyond Title VII. Section 4.03 states that
“an employer is subject to liability in tort to an employee for harm
caused in the course of employment… by the tortious abuse or
threatened abuse of a supervisory or managerial employee’s
authority… even if the abuse or threatened abuse is not within the
scope of employment.” 92
When Cooper threatened to cut Bromfield’s hours or fire her if
she did not accompany him to his sister’s wedding, he abused his
supervisory authority, even though he did not carry out his threats. 93
87

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)).
Id.
89
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
90
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958). (“(2) A master is
not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their
employment, unless: (d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”).
91
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65 (1998).
92
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03 (2015).
93
Anicich, 852 F.3d at 653.
88
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These were precisely the kinds of threats that the Court in Ellerth and
that the Restatement of Employment Law sought to address. 94 Holding
that the defendants could be liable for Cooper’s actions was not, the
court reasoned, a radical departure from traditional principles of
vicarious liability, but merely an “incremental shift.” 95
Finally, the court turned its attention to the foreseeability of the
plaintiff’s injury. The issue was whether Cooper’s “harassing,
controlling, and aggressive behavior toward his female subordinates,”
would have rendered Bromfield’s injury foreseeable to a person of
ordinary prudence. 96 The defendants focused on the fact that Cooper’s
actions were a “radical break from even his most offensive prior
behavior” and that no reasonable employer could have predicted
violence since Cooper had never made explicit threats to hit anyone. 97
However, the court noted that it is not necessary to foresee “the
precise nature of the harm or the exact manner of occurrence; it is
sufficient if, at the time of the defendant’s action or inaction, some
harm could have been reasonably foreseen.” 98 Emphasizing that this
question is a matter of fact, the court concluded, based on the
complaint’s detailed allegations of Cooper’s escalating threats, that a
reasonable jury could “easily find that the employers could and should
have foreseen that Cooper would take the small further step to
violence.” 99
III. BROADENING THE SCOPE OF NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION?
Because this case turned on state tort law, the Seventh Circuit
had to follow Illinois state law, primarily by relying on decisions of

94

Id.
Id.
96
Id. at 654.
97
Id.
98
Id. (quoting Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, 15 N.E.3d 545, 552
(Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
99
Id. at 655.
95
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the Illinois Supreme Court. 100 Finding no other Illinois case “directly
on point,” the court was left to determine how the Illinois Supreme
Court would have ruled with these particularly disturbing facts. 101 But
does Illinois case law support this ruling on negligent hiring and
retention? Was the Seventh Circuit accurate in its prediction that the
Illinois Supreme Court would have moved in this direction? 102 The
somewhat uneven application of negligent hiring and retention
standards makes this a difficult assessment.
Again, the defense in this case relied on three main arguments:
(1) that they had no duty to fire or demote Cooper because of his
behavior; (2) that negligent hiring only applies “when the employee is
on the employer’s premises or using the employer’s chattel”; and (3)
that Bromfield’s injury was not foreseeable. 103 While the Seventh
Circuit may have found strong support in Illinois case law for its
conclusions on duty and foreseeability, its extension of employer
negligence in a case off the employer’s premises and not using the
employer’s chattels is much more tenuous.
A. Duty Cases
Illinois has long recognized that employers have a duty to
refrain from hiring or retaining employees who pose a harm to third
parties. In a 1952 case, Tatham v. Wabash, the Illinois Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that an employer could be held liable for a
negligent breach of duty even for intentional or criminal misconduct
by one of its employees. 104 In Tatham, the plaintiff was severely
beaten by the defendant’s employee, Davis, a “vicious, contentious,
pugnacious and ill-tempered person who was quarrelsome and
frequently engaged in physical combats.” 105 The plaintiff’s complaint
100

Id. at 648-49.
Id. at 648.
102
Id. at 653.
103
Id. at 649.
104
Tatham v. Wabash, 107 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ill. 1952).
105
Id. at 735.
101
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alleged that the defendant was aware of Davis’ “vicious and dangerous
character.” 106 Reversing a lower court’s dismissal, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that when an employer is aware of “conditions
creating a likelihood of injury,” the employer has a “duty to make
reasonable provision against a foreseeable danger involving the
intentional misconduct of a third person.” 107
Illinois courts have consistently recognized this duty. In Bates
v. Doria, for example, an off-duty county sheriff attacked and raped a
woman who was walking her dog in a public park. 108 Even though the
sheriff acted outside the scope of his employment, the court explicitly
recognized that an employer has a “duty to refrain from hiring or
retaining an employee who is a threat to third persons to whom the
employee is exposed.” 109 In Kigin v. Woodmen, a mother brought
claim on behalf of her daughter who was molested by a camp
counselor. 110 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 317,
the court found the camp had a duty to exercise reasonable care and
control over the counselor even though the counselor was acting
outside the scope of his employment. 111 Though acting outside the
scope of his employment, the court paid particular attention to the fact
that the counsellor committed the crime on the camp grounds and
while acting in a supervisory capacity. 112
In Anicich, the Seventh Circuit also recognized this duty, albeit
with a slightly different rationale. Home Depot argued that imposing a
duty in this case would create an obligation for employers to fire or
demote employees simply because of the use of inappropriate
language or sexual misconduct. 113 Rather than pointing to tort cases
106

Id. at 739.
Id. at 739-40.
108
Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
109
See id. (summary judgment for the defendants upheld on other grounds).
110
Kigin v. Woodmen of the World Ins. Co., 541 N.E.2d 735, 735 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989).
111
Id. at 736.
112
Id. at 736-37.
113
Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2017).
107
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that recognize a general duty for employers to refrain from hiring or
retaining employees who are threats to third persons, the Seventh
Circuit pointed to sexual harassment cases to find that Home Depot
had a duty “even independent of Illinois tort law.” 114 The court did not
impose any new obligations on employers, but simply decided that
employer duties under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Illinois
Human Rights Act also applied to tort law. 115
B. Foreseeability Cases
Interestingly, the 7th Circuit did not rely on negligent hiring or
retention cases for its foreseeability analysis. Rather, the court relied
on traditional tort theories of foreseeability. 116 While Cooper’s actions
were a “radical break” from his prior behavior, this was not enough to
destroy foreseeability. 117 Quoting a wrongful death case, the court
found that it was sufficient that Home Depot was aware that that
“some harm could have been reasonably foreseen.” 118 Though this
analysis was based on general Illinois tort law, it is in line with the
foreseeability analysis usually employed in negligent hiring and
retention cases.
In Gregor v. Kleiser, for example, the defendants hired a
bouncer for a house party for approximately 200 teenagers. 119 The
bouncer struck and seriously injured the plaintiff. 120 The defendants’
knowledge of the bouncer’s “vicious propensity for physical violence
upon others, as well as his body building and weight lifting
achievements and extraordinary strength” was sufficient for the

114

Id.
Id.
116
Id. at 654.
117
Id. at 654-55.
118
Id. at 654 (quoting Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., 15
N.E.3d 545, 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)).
119
Gregor by Gregor v. Kleiser, 443 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
120
Id. at 1166.
115
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plaintiffs to state a claim for negligent hiring. 121 In fact, the court
found that this supported a theory of “reckless or willful and wanton
conduct” in the hiring of the bouncer. 122
In Mueller v. Community Consolidated School District 54, a
wrestling coach molested a student after offering to drive her home. 123
Had the school conducted a background check, they would have
discovered a “criminal background exhibiting moral turpitude which
made him unfit for a position dealing with minors,” 124 The defendants
argued that this investigation would not have revealed that the coach
was unfit for his job or that it would have rendered the plaintiff’s
injury foreseeable. 125 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that
the coach’s unfitness for the job was not in question, but rather that he
had some unfitness that made it inappropriate for him to be alone with
minors. 126
The Anicich court cited a negligent supervision case which
followed a similar rationale. In Platson v. NSM America, Inc., a 16year-old plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly touched the plaintiff, rubbed
her shoulders, and rubbed himself up against her. 127 He engaged in
this conduct “in full view of supervisors and other employees.” 128 This
culminated in an episode where the supervisor blocked the plaintiff in
her office, grabbed her by the waist, pressed himself against her, and
tried to force himself on her. 129 Though the plaintiff never made any
complaints, the supervisor’s prior conduct permitted the reasonable

121

Id.
Id.
123
Mueller v. Community Consolidated School District 54, 678 N.E.2d 660,
662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
124
Id. at 664.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Platson v. NSM, America, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
128
Id. at 1285.
129
Id. at 1282.
122
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inference that the defendants should have known the supervisor “was
capable of worse if left alone with plaintiff.” 130
In negligent hiring cases, courts typically find that injuries are
not foreseeable when the employer would not have turned up any
evidence of past violent behavior even if the employer had done a
reasonable investigation. For example, in Strickland v.
Communications and Cable of Chicago, a cable company failed to do
a background check on one of its home-installation subcontractors
who, while on duty, entered a customer’s apartment and raped her at
gunpoint. 131 However, the plaintiffs could not show that company
would have discovered information warning them of the
subcontractors’ violent behavior even if it had conducted a
background check. 132 Had the company conducted a background
check, it would have discovered nothing more than traffic offenses. 133
This was insufficient to put the defendants on notice that the
subcontractor could potentially be a danger to customers. 134
As another example, in Montgomery v. Petty Management
Corporation, a 72-year-old plaintiff got into a fistfight with an offduty McDonald’s cook inside the restaurant. 135 The plaintiff pointed
to the cook’s prior gang affiliation and an arrest record for loitering as
evidence showing that the cook would be a danger to the public. 136
However, the Illinois Appellate Court found this information
insufficient to put the employer on notice that the cook, who worked
primarily in the kitchen, could be a potential danger to customers. 137

130

Id. at 1285.
Strickland v. Communications and Cable of Chicago, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 55,
58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
132
Id.
133
Id. at 57.
134
Id. at 58.
135
Montgomery v. Petty Mgmt. Corp., 752 N.E.2d 596, 597-98 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001).
136
Id. at 600.
137
Id. at 601.
131
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Strickland and Montgomery differ from Anicich, where the
plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the employer had actual notice of
Cooper’s violent and aggressive behavior. 138 As in Platson, Cooper’s
behavior was in full view of other supervisors and employees. 139
Whatever Home Depot may have discovered on a background check
was irrelevant when faced with the fact that its senior management had
actual notice of Cooper’s increasingly abusive behavior towards
Bromfield. 140
C. Illinois’ Application of the Restatement’s Premises/Chattel
Requirement
While the Anicich court’s analysis of duty and foreseeability
was in line with other Illinois negligent hiring and retention cases, its
break from the premises/chattel requirement of the Restatement of
Torts is not entirely supported by Illinois case law. In fact, the court
acknowledged that it was just predicting that the Illinois Supreme
Court would have agreed with its interpretation. 141 However, no other
Illinois case has extended negligent hiring or retention liability where
the plaintiff’s injury neither happened on the employer’s premises nor
with the employer chattels. At the same time, though, the Illinois
Supreme Court has never explicitly held that negligent hiring and
retention claims should be limited in this way.
The premises/chattel requirement of the Restatement of Torts
is part of the proximate cause analysis for negligent hiring and
retention. 142 Illinois courts have followed two lines of reasoning for
proximate causation in negligent hiring and retention cases. They have
either stuck to the premises/chattel requirement of the Restatement of

138

Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 647.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 651.
142
See Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014);
Escobar v. Madsen Const. Co., 589 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
139
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Tort,. 143 or they have used a broader standard to see if the plaintiff’s
injury happened by “virtue of the servant’s employment.” 144
Escobar v. Madsen Const. Co. explicitly rejected a negligent
hiring claim when a hostile, drug-abusing employee shot a coworker
off the employer’s premises and not using an employer’s chattels. 145
There, the Illinois Appellate Court reasoned that the employee’s drug
abuse, threats, and general “orneriness” were not enough to make the
coworker’s injury foreseeable and establish proximate cause for the
injury. 146 Instead, the court noted that the employee was not on the
employer’s job site, not doing the employer’s work, and not using the
employer’s gun. 147 The plaintiff therefore could not present sufficient
evidence to establish a negligent hiring claim. 148
Doe v. Boy Scouts was even stricter in following the
Restatement’s premises/chattel requirement. In Doe, a Boy Scouts
executive sexually assaulted the plaintiff’s son after the executive’s
employment had been voluntarily terminated. 149 The court noted that
there was little support for extending negligent hiring and retention to
post-termination acts. 150 It also pointed to a “rigorous standard of
proximate causation” in which liability “will rest only where the
employee is on the employer's premises or using the chattel of the
employer.” 151
Other cases, however, have been less rigorous. In Carter v.
Skokie Valley, an off-duty security guard kidnapped, raped, and

143

See, e.g., Escobar, 589 N.E.2d.
See, e.g., Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602,
604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
145
Escobar, 589 N.E.2d at 639-40.
146
Id. at 640.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
150
Id. at 561.
151
Id. at 561 (internal quotations omitted).
144
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murdered a woman he knew through work. 152 There, the Illinois
Appellate Court did not rely on the premises/chattel requirement of the
Restatement, but rather examined whether the plaintiff’s injury was
caused “by virtue of the servant’s employment.” 153 This requires that
the “employment itself must create the situation where the employee’s
violent propensities harm the third person.” 154 However, the court still
found that the plaintiff could not establish proximate causation for
conduct of the off-duty guard. 155
Bates v. Doria followed the same “virtue of employment”
standard. 156 There, an off-duty sheriff wearing army fatigues, shot a
passerby with a stun gun, accused her of trespassing on army property,
and took her to the woods to rape her at gunpoint. 157 While not
expressly following the Restatement, the court noted that the sheriff
was “not on duty, not issued departmental weapons or uniform, nor
engaged in conducting any of his duties as a sheriff's deputy.” 158 Even
with the looser standard, the court could not find “some connection
between the plaintiff’s injuries and the fact of employment.” 159 There,
too, the plaintiff’s claim failed the proximate cause element. 160
Thus, while the Seventh Circuit was in line with Illinois case
law for its holdings on duty and foreseeability, it strayed from Illinois
doctrines on proximate causation. Although Illinois courts do not
strictly follow the premises/chattel requirement of the Restatement,
they do apply a fairly rigorous standard to proximate causation. The
Seventh Circuit seems to have loosened that standard a bit.

152

Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602, 602 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993).
153
Id. at 604.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 605-06.
156
Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
157
Id. at 455-56.
158
Id. at 459.
159
Id.
160
Id.
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IV. COMMENTARY
Negligent hiring and retention claims can provide a remedy to
people injured by employees whom employers should have known
were dangerous. These torts fill a gap when other employment-related
claims, such as respondeat superior or civil rights violations, do not
apply. 161 Thus, employers are not just responsible for injuries caused
by employees acting within the scope of employment or for injuries
inflicted on protected classes of people. Instead, they are generally
responsible for ensuring that their employees do not pose a danger to
the public at large, even if the employee is acting intentionally. As the
Illinois Supreme Court in Tatham noted, when an employer is aware
of “conditions creating a likelihood of injury, he has a duty to make
provisions against this foreseeable danger, even though the threatened
hazard is from the intentional misconduct of third persons.” 162
These torts can incentivize employers to be vigilant in the
hiring and retaining of their employees. At the same time, they expose
employers to liabilities that may cause some reluctance in hiring,
particularly for high-risk employees. Courts face the difficult task of
striking a proper balance between these competing interests. The
Seventh Circuit attempted to strike that balance by modifying the
Restatement’s premises/chattel requirement. However, the court
probably could have accomplished the same goal without significantly
modifying existing law.
A. Background and Purpose of Negligent Hiring and Negligent
Retention
In the negligent hiring context, many courts have imposed
special duties on employers when their jobs involve a special risk to

161

See, e.g., Gant v. L.U. Transport Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002); Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1997).
162
Tatham v. Wabash R. Co., 107 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ill. 1952) (emphasis
added).
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third parties. 163 This typically involves a duty to perform a background
investigation. For example, courts have found heightened duties to
investigate for jobs that have a special duty to the public (such as taxi
drivers), when there is a landlord-tenant relationship, or when an
instrumentality of employment creates an opportunity for tortious
conduct (such as cable installers who are required to enter customers’
homes). 164
In Illinois, an employer’s duty does not vanish if the job in
question does not fit into one of these special categories. Indeed, in
Anicich, Cooper was an ordinary regional manager 165 whose position
presumably did not pose a special danger to third parties. Even in
positions that pose no special danger to the public, Illinois still
consider the results or potential results of background
investigations. 166 Often, these cases turn on whether the employer
discovered or would have discovered information showing that its
employee posed a special danger to third parties. 167
Despite the fact that courts consider what employers would
have found had they done a background check, Illinois does not
impose any general requirement for employers to conduct background
checks except for certain statutorily defined classes of workers. 168 In
fact, many Illinois laws limit the use of information obtained from
background checks for hiring decisions. For example, the Illinois
163

Michael Silver, Negligent Hiring Claims Take Off, 73-May A.B.A. J. 72,
74-76 (1987) (discussing various cases where courts have found a heightened duty to
investigate).
164
Id.
165
Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2017).
166
See, e.g., Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898 (Ill. 1999) (considering the
past conduct of a radio DJ); Montgomery v. Petty Mgmt. Corp., 752 N.E.2d 596 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001) (considering the background investigation of a McDonald’s cook).
167
See, e.g., Van Honre, 705 N.E.2dat 906; Montgomery, 752 N.E.2d at 60001; Strickland v. Communications and Cable of Chicago, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 55, 58
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999); and Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660,
664 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
168
See, e.g., Illinois Health Care Worker Background Check Act, 225 ILCS
46.

342

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/11

26

: Your Supervisor As Your Chattel: Broadening the Scope of Negligen

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13, Issue 1

Fall 2017

Human Rights Act prohibits employers from using “the fact of an
arrest or criminal history record information ordered expunged, sealed
or impounded” in its employment decisions. 169 Similarly, under the
Job Opportunities for Qualified Applicants Act, employers may not
“inquire about or into, consider, or require disclosure of the criminal
record or criminal history of an applicant until the applicant has been
deemed qualified for [a] position.” 170
To help strike a balance, many commentators have developed
guidelines for all employers to follow to help avoid negligent hiring
liability. These guidelines include interviewing all applicants,
diligently checking applicant references, investigating prior
employment history, and maintaining accurate records of
investigations. 171
As far as negligent retention and supervision, the burden on
employers tends to focus on monitoring employees and taking
corrective actions when employees behave inappropriately. 172 This
duty is not new and is already in the employer’s interest. As the
Anicich court noted, employers already have a duty of promptly
investigating and correcting civil rights violations, such as sexual
harassment in the workplace. 173 In addition, employers presumably
want their workplaces to be free of harassment and violence. Thus,
employers already have incentives to take corrective actions that limit
their liability for negligent retention and supervision claims.
A valid concern from employers is that a general duty to
ensure employees do not pose a danger to others would chill hiring,
particularly for classes of people who present a special risk. However,
the limited scope of negligent hiring and retention should not chill the
169

775 ILCS 5/2-103(A).
775 ILCS 75/15(a).
171
Michael A. Gamboli, Negligent Hiring – Caveat Employer, 44-NOV R.I.
B.J. 13 (1995); Cathie A Shattuck, The Tort of Negligent Hiring and the Use of
Selection Devices: The Employee’s Right of Privacy and the Employer’s Need to
Know, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 2 (1989).
172
See, e.g., Platson v. NSM, America, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 1278, 1284 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2001).
173
Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2017).
170
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hiring of protected classes of people or “high-risk” applicants. People
with physical and mental disabilities, for example, enjoy substantial
protections in hiring under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Illinois Human Rights Act. 174 These statutes serve to discourage
employers from discrimination against disabled individuals. Moreover,
the statutes only prohibit discrimination against disabled individuals
who are qualified for the position. 175 Employers therefore do not need
to hire individuals with a physical or mental disability if their
disability foreseeably poses a danger to third parties. In any event,
Illinois courts have never found a person’s physical or mental
disability to qualify as a “particular unfitness” for purposes of
negligent hiring or retention. As noted above, “particular unfitness”
typically involves behaviors that exhibit violent or criminal
tendencies. 176
Applicants with criminal backgrounds already face significant
barriers to employment, but potential liability for negligent hiring and
retention claims should not be an additional one. Illinois courts have
been reluctant to extrapolate too much from an employee’s criminal
background, particularly for positions that impose no special duty to
the public. 177 In addition, the proximate cause requirement for
negligent hiring and retention claims limits employer liability based on
foreseeability and connection to employment. Thus, the mere fact of a
criminal background is likely insufficient to satisfy the proximate
cause element. Rather, the criminal background must show some
174

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 42 U.S.C. § 12112; Illinois Human
Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/2.
175
“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, [and] hiring.” 42 U.S.C §
12112(a) (emphasis added); Under the Illinois Human Rights Act, disability is
defined as a physical or mental characteristic of a person “unrelated to the person's
ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.” 775 ILCS 5/1-103(I).
176
See, e.g., Gregor by Gregor v. Kleiser 443 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982); Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997).
177
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Petty Mgmt. Corp., 752 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001).
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particular unfitness, and that particular unfitness must pose some
danger created by the position. 178 For example, an applicant’s prior
history of sexual misconduct with minors is a particular unfitness that
poses danger in a position that requires the employee to be alone with
minors. 179 However, this same applicant likely does not pose a danger
in a position that has limited social interactions and no contact with
children. Thus, employers need not screen out every applicant with a
criminal background. Instead, they must evaluate the requirements of
the position at hand and determine whether the applicant would pose a
danger in the position in light of the applicant’s particular
background. 180
B. Striking a Proper Balance
Admittedly, employers must walk a fine line. If employers are
overzealous in investigating their employees, they face potential
liability for civil rights violations. 181 On the other hand, if they are not
cautious enough, they face liability under negligent hiring and
retention, to say nothing of the non-legal consequences associated with
injuries inflicted on the public and other employees. 182Given this
178

See, e.g., Strickland v. Communications and Cable of Chicago, Inc., 710
N.E.2d 55, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
179
See, e.g., Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997).
180
Shattuck, supra note 171, at 4-5.
181
See, e.g., Murillo v. City of Chicago, 61 N.E.3d 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)
(finding a police sergeant’s use of a janitor’s prior arrest record to deny a security
clearance a violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act).
182
Not only did Home Depot have to deal with the horrific murder of one of its
employees, the sensational case was widely reported in local, national, and
international media outlets, often with Home Depot in the title. See, Jennifer Smith,
Court backs family’s lawsuit blaming Home Depot for death of pregnant employee,
21, who was strangled then raped by her supervisor, THE DAILY MAIL (Mar. 28,
2017); Jonathan Stempel, Home Depot must again face lawsuit over employee’s
murder – US court, REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2017); Michael Tarm, Court restores
Plainfield woman’s suit accusing Home Depot of negligence in daughter’s slaying,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 28, 2017).
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tightrope employers must walk, it is important for courts to apply
consistent standards with negligent hiring and retention claims.
Consistent standards can help employers determine how far they need
to go in both background investigations of applicants and disciplinary
measures for current employees. Consistent standards could also help
disadvantaged groups, such as former felons, because employers may
be less reluctant to hire “risky” employees if they had a clear,
straightforward understanding of their duties under negligent hiring
and retention.
In many ways, the premises/chattel standard of the
Restatement of Torts provides this clear standard. Limiting employer
liability to intentional acts of its employees committed on employer
premises or using employer chattels limits negligent hiring and
retention claims to situations that are presumably under the employer’s
control. After all, the employer is responsible for overseeing what
happens on its own premises and how its chattels are used. Extending
liability beyond premises and chattels extends employer liability to
situations that are further and further removed from the employer’s
control.
In Anicich, however, this standard caused a dilemma.
Bromfield’s murder happened at a private wedding hundreds of miles
from where she worked. 183 Cooper did not use any of Home Depot’s
chattels in committing his crime. Yet, there was an inescapable
connection between Cooper’s employment and Bromfield’s murder.
Cooper met Bromfield through work. He was her supervisor and
continued to be her supervisor despite berating her and threatening her
in full view of other employees. Finally, he used his supervisory
authority to pressure her to go to the wedding. All of this suggests that
the murder could not have happened but for Cooper’s employment
with Home Depot. The premises/chattel standard, therefore, seemed
unfitting.
Certainly, the court felt that attaching liability to Home Depot
was justified. In a dramatic conclusion to his opinion, Judge Hamilton
wrote:
183

Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2017).
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Every life lost to brutality is unique, each family's hell a
private one. We do not diminish that truth when we repeat
that Alisha’s story is an old story that has been told too many
times. Its ending is both shocking and predictable. Alisha's
family is entitled to try to prove its truth. 184
This quote suggests that the court was perhaps persuaded not only by
the shocking facts of this case, but also by a desire to create a new
deterrent for employers. After all, if this horrifying story has been told
“too many times,” the court was likely inclined to use its power to
prevent it from being told again, particularly given the fact that the
case involved a common law tort.
But in creating an additional deterrent, the court warped the
Restatement’s premises/chattel standard. By analogizing supervisory
authority to chattels, the court paved a new avenue for employer
liability without establishing any clear limits. 185 For example, what
exactly constitutes abuse of supervisory authority? Would this
somehow be limited to egregious abuses, such as threatening to cut
hours or fire an employee? Or would more subtle forms of abuse
qualify, such as playing favorites among subordinates? One can
imagine that even subtle forms of abuse could be used to manipulate
or coerce employees.
Next, how exactly does one establish the connection between
abuse of supervisory authority and the plaintiff’s injury? When an
injury happens on the employer’s premises or with an employer’s
chattel, the connection is clear. If an employee strangles a customer in
the employer’s store, the employee is clearly on the employer’s
premises. Similarly, if a maintenance worker uses an employer-issued
key to illegally enter a victim’s apartment, he is using an employer
chattel. But supervisory authority is much more amorphous. It is not a
tangible place or object. There are innumerable ways a supervisor can
abuse authority to manipulate or coerce employees. And there are
184
185

Id. at 656.
Id. at 654.
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countless injuries that could flow from this abuse, from bribery or
extortion to murder. If Illinois were to fully embrace the supervisory
authority as chattel analogy, employers may face liability for a wide
range of injuries where they traditionally have not been liable.
Instead of extending the Restatement’s premises/chattel
requirement to include supervisory authority, the court could have
taken a broader view of the “virtue of employment” standard applied
by some Illinois courts. As noted above, no Illinois case has found
negligent hiring or retention liability when an injury did not happen on
the employer’s premises or using the employer’s chattels. At the same
time, Illinois courts have never strictly followed the premises/chattel
requirement of the Restatement. Several Illinois decisions simply used
a “virtue of employment” standard without invoking the
Restatement. 186 This looser standard could have been extended in the
Anicich case without warping the premises/chattel requirement of the
Restatement.
Using the “virtue of employment” standard, the court could
have simply focused on the foreseeability analysis. In Anicich, Cooper
exhibited some shocking behavior at work which, the court noted, a
reasonable jury could easily have found would lead to “the small
further step to violence.” 187 Discarding the premises/chattel
requirement and focusing instead on foreseeability would have had the
benefit of extending negligent hiring and retention liability in cases
like Anicich without confining courts to the “formalistic” approach of
the Restatement. This would provide plaintiffs with a remedy in cases
like Anicich, where the injury occurred outside the scope of
employment, but where there is a strong connection to the
employment relationship.
Illinois courts already engage in this foreseeability analysis
when evaluating proximate cause in negligent hiring and retention
claims. Extending it a bit would simply require employers to be more
vigilant when their employees exhibit alarming behaviors. If an
186

See, e.g., Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
187
Id. at 655.
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employee exhibits particularly violent behavior, as Cooper did in
Anicich, employers should bear a heavier burden. They should have a
stronger duty to take corrective action. And in these situations, liability
could extend further off-duty as the employee’s on-duty behavior
becomes more outrageous. On the other hand, if the employee exhibits
nothing but ordinary behavior, then commits some heinous act, the
employer would not be liable, perhaps even if the act occurs on the
employer’s premises or using the employer’s chattels. While certainly
not a bright-line rule, focusing on foreseeability would serve the dual
purpose of providing injured third parties a remedy while also
incentivizing employers to be more vigilant in taking corrective
actions against their aberrant employees.
This approach would not necessarily chill the hiring of “high
risk” applicants, such as felons or applicants with past criminal
backgrounds. Assuming a position has limited contact with the public
and poses no special opportunity for tortious conduct, even applicants
with serious criminal backgrounds would not create significant
liability for employers. For example, an employee formerly convicted
of armed robbery working in a warehouse who exhibits no unusual
behaviors at work would not create any additional liability if he robs
one of his coworkers in the parking lot. While the employer may have
notice of his prior criminal conviction, without anything more it could
not be reasonably foreseen that he would rob again on the employer’s
premises. In addition, this hypothetical robbery could not be said to
have happened by “virtue of employment.” After all, nothing about his
employment, aside from his mere presence in the parking lot, could be
said to have created the opportunity for the crime. At the same time, if
this same employee began exhibiting violent or abusive behavior at
work, the employer would be on a heightened duty to take corrective
action. Knowledge of the past criminal conviction combined with the
threatening on-duty behavior could put the employer on notice, and
make the employer potentially liable even if the employee commits a
crime off the employer’s premises and not using the employer’s
chattels, so long as there is some connection between the crime and
the fact of employment.
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The limiting devices that Illinois courts already have in place
would prevent this approach from opening the flood gates of employer
liability. Illinois courts have consistently held that simply knowing
someone through work is not enough to find employer liability for
negligent hiring and retention claims. 188 The proximate cause analysis
has always required more. In addition, this approach would only
expand liability in the relatively few instances where respondeat
superior would not apply and where civil rights statutes do not
preempt negligent hiring and retention claims. Thus, taking a broader
view of foreseeability with the “virtue of employment” standard would
not greatly expand the scope of employer liability while, at the same
time, providing victims like Bromfield some form of remedy.
CONCLUSION
Employers are confronted with liabilities from many fronts.
For employers, negligent hiring and retention may seem to be yet
another liability which they could face despite all reasonable
precautions. And, without proper limits on these torts that indeed
could be the case. However, negligent hiring and retention claims can
provide an important remedy for plaintiffs who are injured by
employees the employer should have known were dangerous. Illinois
case law is rife with examples of plaintiffs who suffered horrific
injuries that were somehow connected to their employment.
Unfortunately, Anicich provides yet another such example.
For negligent hiring and retention claims to retain their
viability, courts must apply consistent standards that are just for both
injured parties and employers. While the Restatement’s
premises/chattel standard may have created a bright line, cases like
Anicich reveal the impracticality of its approach. However, the Anicich
court’s expansion of Restatement standard may prove to be equally
unworkable. Instead, a broader view of foreseeability with the “virtue
of employment” standard could help to remedy victims such as
188

Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
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Bromfield while incentivizing employers to be more vigilant in
monitoring employees that pose a danger to others. Given the
numerous limiting principles Illinois courts already place on negligent
hiring and retention claims, a broader view of foreseeability would
truly be an “incremental shift” as opposed to the potentially farreaching expansion of the Restatement’s doctrine taken by the Seventh
Circuit in Anicich.
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